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Random Walk
Burton Malkiel defines a random walk as
"one In which future steps or directions cannot be
predicted on the basis of past actions/ Within the
context of the stock market, a random walk for a
stock's price rrteans that if is as iikeiy to fall as to
rise, regardiess of previous price performance
(Maikiet. 1996). Essentlafly, random waik impiies
that "winners" couid not consistently be picked.
The Wait Street Journal lends credence to this
hypothesis with its long-running contest of "darts
versus the experts." where stocks selected by darts
tossed at the financial page are matched,
performance-wise, with stocks seleaed by market
experts. The random walk hypothesis is not
particularly popuiar in the general financial
community as it implies that financial management
brings only a layer of cost - and the investor is
better served by investing in a fund that cioseiy
represents the overall market. "Random walk" was
derided as an academic contrivance by many in the
financial sector. However, the hypothesis gained
support as financial Information fiowed more freeiy
and in greater volume over time, and
market/industry/firm transactions became more
transparent.
Random walk can be viewed as a variation
on the efficient market hypothesis. An efficient
market can be proposed to exist when the foiiowing
conditions hold:
a. Many active, weii-infofmed, and
rational investor participate in a
mari<et where no one individual has
any power to manipulate a security's
price.
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b. information is reiativeiy costless and is
equally available to all investors.
c. New information is generated
randomiy, with information events
independent of one another.
d. Investors act quickly and rationaily in
response to new information.
To a large extent, these conditions reflect
the cufrent state of securities markets. Moreover,
in their presence, new information about corpora
tions wil! be quickly incorporated into stock prices.
Furthermore, price movements are independent of
one another and tend to be random in nature. That
is, today's price change is in response to new
information - different information from that which
drove yesterday's price change. (Jones, 2000).
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). to
the extent that it is heid, is disquieting to the
financia! Industry. A "true believer' would have no
use for technical analysis, evidence on deviations
from intrinsic value, or money management skiils in
generai; he/she would simply take what the market
gives them by buying into a fund (or seiecting
individual stocks) that is/ are representative (a
blood sampie) of tbe overaii stock market.
That being said, the EMH is most useful as
a benchmark for efficiency; a means of comparison
between the ideal and the actuai. Many studies
have attributed strong deviations from EMH to
investor overreaction and underreaction, the
January effect, the small-cap effect, the weekend
effect, herd behavior, momentum investing - to
name a few. Most investors believe they can out
perform the stock market; othenvise, they'd place
their savings in index funds and be done with it.
The decision to buy a particular stock at a
particular time and the choices among alternative
investments are grounded in psychoioglcai and
sociological factors as weli as eoonomics, Rationai
economic man (homo economicus) recognizes that
irrational investor behavior is normal and must be
factored into the investment decision. In this day of
information overload, few investors are zeaiots who
ascribe to only one theory of sound ittvesting; tse it
fundamentai-vaiuation; technical analysis; or
behavioral reactiveness. The irony, and the focus
of this paper is that as market information
becomes more voiuminous, timely, accurate, ahd
universally available, the validity of the EfficierJt
Market Hypothesis may diminish,
Fundannental Analysis
Contemporary investment phiiosophy can
be segmented into four loosefy perimetered camps;
fundamental vaiue, technical analysis, momentum,
and behaviorist Fundamentalists attempt to anive
at a film's intrinsic value by iooking at earnings,
dividends, earnings grm^rth, and income/balance
sheet ratios. After calculating a stock's Intrinsic
value with a standard formula, It is compared to
market price to determine whether the security is a
buy or a sell- John 8urr Williams, in Theory of
V^iae, was first to develop an actual
formuia, the Dividend Discount Model (DDM)for
calculating a stock's fundamental vaiue. (Malkeil,
1996), However, the 'value school of Investment*
was inshtutlonalized by Benjamin Graham, who
with David Dodd authored Security An&fy$i$ and,
individually, The Intelligent investor. Graham took a
consenratlve tack In his investment strategy;
carefully drawing the line between 'speculation*
and inveshnent. Per Graham, "An Investment
operation is one which, upon thorough analysis
promises safety of pnncipai and an adequate
retumi. Operations not meeting these nsquirements
are speculative,'' {Graham, 1973),
Technical Analysis
Technical analysts pride themselves in
being oblivious to intrinsic value. Rather, it is the
potential supply (sellers) and demand (buyers) for a
stock that matter. Technicians study price and
voiume data for trends that tend to repeat
themselves over time and form the basis for the
buy/seil decision. Appiying patterns of past stock
perfonnanoe to present market data enables the
technician to identify buy and sell signais.
Momenhtm inveshng
Amentum investing hinges about a
variation on the theme of inertia - that a body in
motion tends to remain in motion. Hence, a
company whose growth is fiat tends to remain that
way and a stock experiencing rapid growth is likely
to do so for a considerable pedod of time.
Responding to sustainable growth signals,
investors exhibit femming-like behavior in rushing
into a stock, providing evidence of the "bandwagon
effecf, where an object becomes more vaiuabie as
more people buy it. Momentum investors forgo
searching for hidden vaiue in perceptibiy "dead*
stocks and, instead, look for companies
experiencing some signal event that is iikely to
drive stock price upward for an extended period of
time. Momentum investors tend to lag behind value
investors in buying a particular stock and tend to
hoid the stock after value investors have taken
profits.
Anknai Spirits and Behavlorlem
Behavioral investing involves the
psychological analysis of overall market behavior
and individual investors, who, m the aggregate,
comprise the market. According to Shefrin (2000),
there are three psychoiogicai elements underlying
investor behavior. First, investors tend to fali back
on past experience in establishing their future
investment strategies. The Oxford Dictionary and
Theaaurvs defines the heuristic method as' a
system of education under vs^ich pupils are trained
to find things out for themselves," investors
develop and adhere to certain ailes of thumb in
undertaking financial investments. These
benchmarks tend to t)e efTOf»prone and, as a resuft,
most investors terKl to act in a pre-disposed and
biased manner. Investors wiil prefer certain
behavioral frames to others. Erroneous heuristic
guideiines and frame dependence may, in turn,
affect stock prices and move them away from,
rather than toward, intrinsic value, it fotiows that
such behaviomMI! make markets less, rather than
more, efficient (Shefrin, 2000),
John Maynard Keynes aptly tied the term
'animal spirits' to Investor behavior. Animai spirits,
per Keynes, are not solely instinctive reactions to
new market Information; they are a positive for the
marketplace; driving trading and transactions when
Informational signals are mixed ^ or absent. Given
uncertainty, and the lack of a clear (lodestar)
course of action, animai spirlte provide the investor
with the impetus to overcome risk aversion
(Matthews, 1991).
At the core of investor behaviorism and the
subsequent deviations of stock prices from fair
value and bubble creation, lies investor
overconfidence, Daniel, et al. (1998) proposes that
variatbns In investor confidence stem from 'biased
setf-attribution.* If the investor incomes
increasingly confident In his ability to ferret out
importam data, assimila^a and evaiuata it,
ganerating ''privata informaUon" he wiii under*
estimate his own forecasting errors while
overvaiuing his abiiitias as a stock-picker.
Moreover, the informed, overconftdent investor wiff
overreact to his self-generated private information
and under-raact to putjlic signals (stock split
announcements, dividend changes, insider tjuying
or selitng) that may counter or corroborate his
personal perspective on a stock. Studies indicate
that personal overconfidance, in general, tends to
be stronger for more complex tasks (illness
diagnoses, stock analysis) than for relatively
straightforward, but cerebral, tasks - such as
mathematical calculations. The overreactlon -
correction behavior in the stock market Is reflected
in negative long run autocorreiation In market
returns such as excess volatility in stock prices
(Daniel, et ai„ 1998). Moreover, public
information supports investors' private signals,
confrdence levels rise signiflcantiy. However, when
public information contradicts private signals,
confidence levels fail only modestiy as investors
attribute (investment) failure to external events ~
beyond their control.
Psychologists find that people system
atically discount certain types of Information when it
is inconsistent with a held set of beliefs while
placing a premium on information that fits their
paradigm, Odean (1998) notes that ifoverconfident
traders weigh their own (self-generated) signals
more than public or common signals, the private
signals will be dissimilar among traders and nssult
in a higher volume of trading - than if ali traders
gave a greater weight to the common signals,
Psychoiogists have opined that the motivatjonai
state is characterized by impulses (animal spirits)
such as the particularly American taste for victory,
perse, and aggression (Matthev>«, 1991), Applying
motivational theory to investor behavior, Princeton's
Daniel Kahneman writing in Psychology Today
(1999) proposes the followir^; (a) inve^ors
(American) are enamored with their own skiils and
regard themselves to be better than other investors;
(b) the disutility of losses is greater than the utility
of gains, with the result that investors hold onto
losers ~ in tacit denial of having made a poor
choice; and, (c) investors like to be in control and
evidence this in (too) frequent ttading to create the
illusion of 3 sttuctured approach to weaitti
enhancement.
Individuais tend to weigh more recent
information more heavily and short weight cider
information, if ail the traders in the stock market
were homo economicus, the market would act as if
it had a "single driver." Biased self-attribution
inserts a "second driver* into the investment seat
which. In turn, distorts prices and increases
volatility (and volume) while reducing market
efficiency (Odean, 1998).
Internet, Infoirnatlon Overtoad,
Dimming Lodestar
The modest point of the paper is that
financial markets will become more voiatile over
time. The added volatility, ironksaliy, will stem in
large part from improved technology which, m
theory, should make the very same markets more
efficient and less volatile.
In irratfomi Exuberance, Robert Schiller
traces the various factors from the media, to the
maturing of the baby boomers, to the internet, the
growth of mutual funds, hegemony of the US in the
international arena, that wH be behind the growth of
future market bubtiies. However, this author
proposes, it is the peculiar chemistry of optimism,
hubris, and tedinology that wiil drive the market,
with larger gaps between fundamental and paper
values, increased market volume and volatility, and
recurrent bubbles. In data compiled by the
International Data Corporation, the numt>erof
internet users in the US wilt exceed 17S million by
2003 (ShHIer, p. 206), The internet itseif, with its
immediacy of information, gives the viewer a sense
of empowerment; of being on top of any investment
situation, kindling investor confidence and hence
support for high market valuations. The number of
on-line brokerage accounts ~ while growing rapidly,
has much further to go till the saturation point. On
line accounts numbered 3.1 million in 1999 and are
projected to grow to 9 million in 2003 (Schiiler),
The potential for explosive growtti in on-iine
accounts wiii become a reality if 1%-2% of Did Age
and Survivors insurance tax (6.2% per individuai) is
allowed to be funneled into private accounts. On
line investing generates an exuberance of its own,
boosting confidence, trading, and voiatility. Internet
investment and financial sites can provide the
investor wth encyclopedic infonnation about a
particular company or industry wHh a keystroke.
However, the torrent of information now
available to the individual investor is not without
cost. More than forty years ago, Herbert Simon
identified two factors which tended to negate
rationality in decision-making: (a) because of time
constraints, it is not possible to consider ai! the
Information necessary to arrive at a rational
decision; and (b) there are insufficient Inner*
programs to properly digest aii the infofmation,
resulting in informational overload {Schwartz,
1S98). In the mtemet age, Simon's axiom holds
truer than ever; finite timeframea piua overload
transiate into iess rational decisions.
Thus, a critical determinant in Investor
psychology Is over-confidentse (weak case) or
hubris (strongcase). There are strong elements of
both empowerment and the casino involved in om
line investing which are heightened by the never-
diminishing waterfall of fresh information. Internet
investing has become the perfect cottage industry
for the 21** century; low barriers to entry, perfect
information, and innumerabie price-taking ffinms,"
The irony is that more perfect information is
presumed to move prices more quickly toward an
inherent value. And well it might, absent hubris,
frame and heuristic dependency, and investors'
psyche, .
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